natürlich, aber sekundäre intentionen sind bspw..
- das thema internationales insolvenzrecht wird erneut aufgegriffen, und sogar dem IWF ist die sache mit argentinien zu krass
- der artikel ist einfach unwahrscheinlich gut (natürlich verstehe ich überhaupt nichts von krieg),
weil instruktiv. TNI ist ein berühmtes international affairs magazine ... associated with the realist school of foreign policy thought und erklärt klar und einfach eine bestimmte kriegerische vorgehensweise und (jenen die natürlich überhaupt nichts von krieg verstehen) auch krieg an sich. ein auszug, wobei der artikel
insgesamt total lehrreich ist
Zitat:
The forward positioning of U.S. troops is useful for shoring up the effectiveness of American extended deterrence in the region and should be done immediately. But that step alone will not deter Russia. The deterrent aspect of this forward posture is that it puts U.S. assets and manpower in a vulnerable position—creating a so-called tripwire—thus showing commitment and creating the incentive to defend the allied country. The loss of American soldiers to an initial attack by the enemy would, so the argument goes, create powerful pressures for Washington to respond. As French general Ferdinand Foch reportedly said when asked before World War I how many British troops would be needed for the security of France, “Give me one, and I will make sure he gets killed on the first day of the war.” Or, as Thomas Schelling put it in more recent times, the purpose of placing thousands of American troops on our allies’ territory is so that “bluntly, they can die.” But what if they do not die? What if they’re never even involved because the attack is so limited—a “jab and pause” like that in Crimea—that it does not come near American forces? If the aggressor establishes a quick fait accompli, then the U.S. forces would have to be used not to defend an ally’s territory, but rather to attack an enemy that has already achieved its territorial goal and, in all likelihood, has ceased military operations. As Henry Kissinger put it, “Once the aggressor is in possession of his prize . . . the psychological burden [das bezieht sich wirklich auf die bevölkerungen der involvierten nationen] shifts in his favor. The defender must now assume the risk of the first move. The aggressor can confine himself to outwaiting his opponent.”
das zieht sich so durch fünf seiten, aber marihuana mag ich natürlich
auch nicht und finde, das hat alles seine richtigkeit *diskutier
